CRDM 701
Week 10 - Karla
Happy Halloween all!
Adams writes in "Network Topologies and Virtual Place," "If, as structurationists argue, place is process (Pred 1984b), then process can also be place; the implication of this processual similarity is that place indicates a process that might be divorced from material structure and location" (94). He further comments that "communication topology can be detached from physical structure of place, yet remain tied to the concept of that place" (94). Given the increase in use of online environments and tools for communication, these assertions seem particularly relevant, especially when one attempts to understand the geography of computer-mediated communication. Adams mentions how names can reflect function (such as "round table") and locations (such as a town hall or bedroom) can suggest the kinds of communication that customarily occur in those surroundings. As he notes, in terms of the places themselves, they are "physically designed and socially designated" to suport the types of communication that occur in them (94). How does this translate for online environments, such as Second Life, which incorporate representations of real-life places, such as houses, bedrooms, etc.? Does the anonymity of users help to break down barriers about what kinds of communication typically occur where? If so, does this effect help to reshape our notions somewhat about what types of communication we engage in within the real-life places, or do we make such a sharp distinction between online and actual that the former does not carry over so much to the latter?
According to Adams (again in "Network"), "[I]n the distanciated world, distress is often hidden by distance, and actions are easily divorced from their consequences in the minds of actors" (95). When I read this statement, I thought about my own research project involving online therapy and how distance/lack of physical presence affects communication between patient and practitioner. Of course, there are some differences between comparing etherapy to virtual worlds in which users' actual identities can be essentially completely disguised and, as a result, the fear of sanctions for their behaviors decreases. Nevertheless, I found it striking that, as Adams indicates, "[o]ne consequence of modernization is that place, as a moral force, has dwindled in power" (95). He mentions that when "[p]lace had a strong moral influence in regard to one's personal actions . . . if one broke the rules of social conduct, the local community bore witness and would pass judgment" (95). Can we interpret the punishment (which can range from castigations to banishment) of those who inappropriately use online forums as comparable to the judgment from the local community Adams mentions? How important is "embodied" judgment to maintaining the influence of place on moral behavior?
On a final note from "Network," Adams states, "Something experienced through all of the senses acquires a greater quality of realism than something sensed only through one sensory mode" (99). He later follows this claim with the assertion that "[i]f the experience of physical landscapes seldom involves more than one or two sensory modes, it hardly makes sense to hold computers (or other media) to a standard of reality that is multisensory" (100). Adams gives as an example of walking into a dark room, smelling gas, and concluding there is a gas leakage without turning on the light for confirmation, as an actual physical situation in which individuals are willing to depend on one sense to reach decisions. In contrast, virtual reality depends primarily on sight (of course), privileging that sense over the others. Do we privilege embodiment so that we are willing in actual physical situations to depend on one sense to reach conclusions but are critical of VR for not being as multi-sensory as we would like? Because I am within the physical space and know it to be real, even if I can only use one sense to determine the circumstances of that situation, does that make it more acceptable for me to critique VR because it does not provide me with the multi-sensory environment I want? Although graphics have improved, does the fact I realize those visuals in VR are not completely life-like contribute to my willingness to be critical because the one sense I must rely on in that environment seems lacking?
Adams' claims in "The World of the Extensible Self" regarding uncertainty and miscommunication were especially interesting to me in light of my research focus. As he states, "Uncertainty is always involved in communication's linkages through space-time" (3). Further, "The ability to communicate at a distance supports the coordination of activities over great distances and hence aids the control of many risks, yet the risk of miscommunication becomes progressively greater as communications spread out in space, multiply, and engage with unfamiliar social contexts" (10). Do we simply accept this increase in potential for miscommunication as the trade-off for being able to bridge gaps in space and time? Although we may attempt to use certain methods to reduce the likelihood of miscommunication, such as emoticons, for example, do not these means present their own complications (how do I know my interpretation of that facial expression is the same as yours?)? Of course, in an actual physical place I could make an expression that you do not understand, but presumably you could ask me what I was feeling or thinking for clarification.
The issue of power arises both in Adam's "World" and Castells' pieces. As Adams mentions, access is one factor of the power struggle, as there are some who have access to technologies and others who do not (or on a more limited basis). Castells writes in "The Information Technology Revolution," "Differential timing in access to the power of technology for people, countries, and regions is a critical source of inequality in our society" (34). Further, "elites learn by doing, thereby modifying the applications of technology, while most people learn by using, thus remaining within the constraints of the packaging of technology" (37). Although the Internet may be perceived as a wonderful means by which to achieve a greater sense of democracy and break down some power barriers, do we view most Internet users as just that (users), rather than as the elites who are "doers"? If so, how does this impact our conception of the Internet?
Castells discusses the role of governments in shaping technology in his "Prologue: The Net and the Self," stating, "[O]n the one hand, the state can be, and has been in history, in China and elsewhere, a leading force of technological innovation; on the other hand, precisely because of this, when the state reverses its interest in technological development, or becomes unable to perform it under new conditions, a statist model of innovation leads to stagnation, because of the sterilization of society's autonomous innovative energy to create and apply technology" (10). The influence of the state on technology becomes of great concern when one considers Castells' earlier claim, "Indeed, the ability or inability of societies to master technology, and particularly technologies that are strategically decisive in each historical period, largely shapes their destiny, to the point where we could say that while technology per se does not determine historical evolution and social change, technology (or the lack of it) embodies the capacity of societies to transform themselves, as well as the uses to which societies, always in a conflictive process, decide to put their technological potential" (7). Although the desire for governments to take more of a "hands-off" approach toward technology is validated to an extent, how uninvolved in the technology do we want governments to be? How do we weigh the advantages/disadvantages of government interference versus absence?
*You may have noticed I did not discuss Latour yet. I enjoyed his "Mixing Humans and Non-Humans: The Sociology of the Door Closer," but did not quite find a way to weave it in with the above comments on the other pieces. One of his claims, in particular, stuck with me, so I will mention it briefly: "The bizarre idea that society might be made up of human relations is a mirror image of the other no less bizarre idea that techniques might be made up of nonhuman relations" (273). I found it interesting Latour considers the non-human in a sociological way and how doing so affects our understanding of what sociology/social studies means. Maybe this will come up in class tomorrow.
Posted at 12:49PM Oct 31, 2007 by kmlyles in General | Comments[0]