Actual Virtual Boundaries
I felt that one of the most interesting statements in this week?s reading came from Kellerman, when he claimed that while our physical mobility ?is still restrained by the time-bounded friction of distance, the virtual spatial mobility of humans is not? (p. 74). In other words, despite these enabling technologies, our physical movements are still limited by time and distance, but information can move anywhere quickly, eliminating any constraints on our virtual mobility. I found this statement interesting because it reflects a belief that there are not constraints on our use of technologies that make us virtually mobile and that their mere presence has created a utopian cyber world without boundaries. That world simply does not exist.
Wood and Graham point out that Internet routers are being programmed to prioritize information that is being sent based solely on the ?profitability? of the end-user (p. 184). Jensen ties the idea of mobility to the money economy, stating that the flow of goods and people in the city is directly tied to the ?moving stream of money? (p. 148). Based on these two statements, if do not have (or, perhaps more importantly, appear to not have) the same amount of money to spend as another web surfer, my access to certain sites may be delayed or denied ? my virtual mobility is constrained.
Sheller and Urry discuss the divisive nature of mobile technologies, pointing out that ?moving between places physically or virtually can be a source of status and power? and that access to networking tools ?is obligatory in order to participate fully? in our society (p. 213). Having different access, then, is another constraint on our virtual mobility. Those without full access cannot enjoy full status or participation in our society. And I do not mean no access at all ? clearly no Internet access is a constraint. What about areas that do not have access to high-speed Internet? Where I grew up, high-speed Internet is still not available outside of the few semi-non-rural areas. There is no mobile phone capability. How doe that constrain their access? The proliferation of high-speed Internet itself is a boundary. If I want to access a site as banal as MLB.com, I will be forced to view a stripped-down narrowband version of the site. In this case, it?s not simply that someone else has priority ? someone else has more access (more mobility) than me. Wood and Graham state that boundaries such as this ?threaten to divide contemporary society into high-speed, high-mobility and connected and low-speed, low-mobility and disconnected classes? (p. 178). Aren?t the poor and rural classes divided enough already without having to worry about virtual mobility?
Another part of the readings that I would like to touch on is that dealing with identity. Jensen argues that there is a link between the way that ?we travel through the city and the way we perceive ourselves? (p. 158). Because of this, there is a close connection between mobility, social order, and identity. He also states that, according to Goffman, the individual ?goes about constrained to sustain a viable image of himself in the eyes of others? (p. 153). If one?s mobility is a source of status or power, and one is lacking in virtual mobility, how does that affect their identity? Of course, Jensen is focused mainly on mobility in urban areas, where access does exist. But does the simple presence of high-speed virtual mobility mean that everyone has access? Jensen points out a study that ?concluded that the most significant factor affecting and modifying the behavior of pedestrians in a metropolis is the number of people in their immediate environment? (p. 156). So, in the city, this differing access may have a much larger impact on the identity of those in the low-speed class ? the more people there are to compare status to, the more obvious it becomes that one can make no comparison.
So far, this says nothing about the boundaries that exist within the high-speed class. In his discussion of Wirelessness, Kellerman claims that mobile phones can ?nullify possible isolation? and provide ?additivity between corporeal and virtual mobility? (p. 101). But this additivity creates another boundary that is only differentially permeable. If I have high-speed Internet at home and a mobile phone, that does not guarantee me boundless virtual mobility. Instead, I would need at least a laptop and a hot-spot, or that ultimate mobile status-symbol, the iPhone. Kellerman also points out that ?accessibility [is more] important than mobility? (p. 107). I see this as a creation of a third class of virtually mobile beings: the accessible, the mobile, and those who are neither. My question becomes, then, how do we narrow the gap that is widening between them? Or is the gap even narrowable? Even if infrastructure would allow wider access, would money still hold a large portion of the population back?