Week Five
A surprising theme presented itself throughout this week?s readings. Across the discussions of machines, information, and materiality, all four articles raised the issue, to some degree, of differentiation between humans and machines. It is this theme, machines versus our ?soft bodies? that I would like to address in this week?s blog.
In his work to study control and communication in the animal versus the machine, Wiener?s essay focuses on machine control and how ? the machine appears now, not as a source of power, but as a source of control and a source of communication? (71). Wiener?s argument seems to stress an underlying nervousness regarding the consequence of overarching machine control which is pinpointed in one of his final comments regarding his recommendation that ?we must value leisure? (72). This comment seems so out of place and random but is critical in his recommendations for the future. In order to keep our dependence and ?worship? to the machines at bay, Wiener indicates that we should increasingly value those life elements which a machine can never obtain. Although he does not expand on this recommendation, it is the idea of the emotional differentiation between humans and machines that then also appears in the work by both Hayles and Lupton.
In Hayles? discussion of information and materiality she, like Wiener, suggests the importance of distinguishing between strictly human elements and those that have (and will continue to be) managed by our machines; ? the symbiotic relation between humans and intelligent machines has complex effects that do not necessarily all point in the same direction for example?the privileging of human qualities that machines do not share? (92). In the midst of her discussion regarding materiality she too stresses the importance of what we as humans can always hold over and above the machines that have ?taken over? in our everyday lives.
It is also interesting to note that even in the heavily technological breakdown of Hobart and Schiffman?s Realm of Pure Techniques, there is also a reference to the possibility that a computer may become biological in the future (205). They distinguish how our computers have ?drawn the information idiom so far away from the immediacy of experience that no content whatsoever is retained in [the] digital symbols? (203) yet they shortly thereafter acknowledge the humanistic possibilities for the ?container? of these non-content digital mechanisms.
Deborah Lupton?s article showcases the theme of human qualities versus machine more so then all of the others. Despite Lupton?s acknowledgement that ?even in the age of the technosocial subject, life is lived through bodies? (102), the emphasis of her article is how the computer user has become ?embodied? in the machines/technology. Her work differentiates between the embodiment experienced by the concept of cyborgs versus computer hackers and how these types of experiences have led, in part, to the development of the ?humanized computer.? Lupton highlights the intense emotions we experience with computers, specifically personal computers. She details the significance of trust and alternating fear and dependence we feel, ?we struggle with the pleasure and fears of dependency: to trust is to reap the rewards of security, but it is also to render ourselves vulnerable to risk? (110). Most readers would be able to relate directly to the emotional intensity she describes between humans and their personal computers but most would offer this description for a relationship they have experienced between other humans not with a machine which further stresses how intermingled the human and machine elements ? even emotional ? have become. It is what Wiener and Hayles warn when suggesting humans should maintain a level of emotion that is all their own ? something the machines can?t ever control.
Where I take issue with Lupton?s discussion of the emotional connections we make with our machines is in the assumption that it is an intrinsic experience for all who work with personal computers. Individuals are solely responsible for the intensity they create between their inanimate objects and themselves. Also, where Lupton?s discussion may be weakest is in her attempt to connect the machine (computer) with the female body. Maternal descriptions are one thing but to assume that the machine is perceived with the same level of mystique as the female body seems too far fetched. It is a description that would appear to come not from depth of research but directly from the typical male user.